The theory of incomplete contracts has been used to study the relationship between buyers and suppliers following the deployment of modern information technology to facilitate coordination between them. Previous research has sought to explain anecdotal evidence from some industries on the recent reduction in the number of suppliers selected to do business with buyers, by appealing to relationship-specific costs that suppliers may incur. In contrast, this paper emphasizes the fact that information technology enables greater completeness of buyer-supplier contracts through more economical monitoring of additional dimensions of supplier performance. The number of terms included in the contract is an imperfect substitute for the number of suppliers. Based on this idea, alternative conditions are identified under which increased use of information technology leads to a reduction in the number of suppliers without invoking relationship-specific costs.
Introduction
The access revolution spawned by the emergence of the World-Wide Web in the 1990s led to rapid growth in business-to-consumer (B2C) electronic commerce. Business-to-business (B2B) electronic commerce, however, has followed a different path. Until recently, companies had focused on continued development of private networks because of their existing investments in technology, security issues on the Internet, and the lack of a common Web-based interface to support efficient on-line transaction processing. As we move into the new millennium, several industry initiatives are addressing the issues related to B2B electronic commerce on the World-Wide Web, and another Web revolution is expected to transform how organizations interact with each other in new B2B relationships. Our objective in this paper is to analyze how buyersupplier relationships change as modern information and telecommunication technology (ITT) reduces transaction cost (i.e., the costs of search, coordination and monitoring).
In this paper, we posit that improvements in ITT not only reduce coordination cost (which tends to increase the optimal number of suppliers), they also increase the ability to monitor supplier compliance in an economical fashion. Increased monitoring of supplier activities enable a conversion of these factors from non-contractible to contractible, making supplier contracts more complete. But with more suppliers and more contract terms, monitoring costs may increase more than the benefits from more tightly specified supplier contracts. In our analysis, we focus on buyer-supplier relationships between a single buyer and multiple homogenous, pre-qualified suppliers in the presence of changes in ITT that affect contract completeness. We show that it may be optimal for the buyer to either increase or decrease the number of suppliers he deals with, depending on how the cost of monitoring increases with the number of suppliers and contract terms. Malone et al. (1987) analyzed the effect of information technology on outsourcing decisions, focusing on transaction costs incurred in the dealings between a buyer and his suppliers. They found that the increased use of ITT decreases buyer search costs and leads to a reduction in vertical integration and to an increase in 3 the reliance on markets for the supply of parts in manufacturing. Using similar analysis of transaction cost, Bakos (1991) found that the increased use of ITT leads to reduced cost of coordination of buyer-supplier activities, which would tend to increase the number of suppliers the buyer chooses to do business with.
Previous Research
While these transaction cost-based result have found some empirical support in that information technology investments lead to smaller firms Brynjolfsson et al. (1994) , there is also evidence from the automobile industry that there is a general tendency toward a reduction in the number of suppliers with whom the buyers are doing business Helper (1991) , Cusumano and Takeishi (1991) . The analysis in this paper builds upon the transaction cost literature and augments it by considering how increased use of ITT impacts simultaneously the breadth of enforceable terms included in contracts and the optimal number of suppliers.
In the literature studying inter-organizational systems and investments in these systems, the focus has been on asset ownership and the distribution of benefits arising from these joint investments. Building upon work by Grossman and Hart (1986) , Moore (1990, 1999) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992) on incomplete contracts and asset ownership, Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993a,b) and Clemons et al. (1993) reconciled this theoretical prediction with observed reduction in the number of suppliers in industries such as automobiles. They relied on the assumption that suppliers, while investing in interorganizational systems, incur relationship-specific costs that are shared by the buyer in a bargaining game. These costs outweigh the lower coordination and search costs, and lead to a reduction in the optimal number of suppliers.
In the work by Clemons and Kleindorfer (1992) , the distribution of benefits is based on ex post bargaining. Since the benefits of the investments are unkonwn ex ante, opportunistic behavior on part of the participants results in under-investment in inter-organizational systems. The higher the relationship-specificity of the investment and the higher the switching cost of the participants, the lower the investment in the system. More recent developments in the inter-organizational systems literature incorporate the ideas of incomplete contracting. Bakos and Nault (1997) extended the framework of Hart and Moore (1990) to study implications of ownership for network asset investments. Based on calaculations of Shapley values in ex post bargaining, they derived conditions to determine the best ownership structure for essential network assets.
Information Systems Research 17(2), pp. 180-193, c 2006 INFORMS Han et al. (2003 combined the ideas of Clemons and Kleindorfer (1992) and Bakos and Nault (1997) to study the effects of inter-organizational system investments within the framework of incomplete contracting over the system investments. Anticipating their ex post bargaining power, participants will adjust their investments based on the expected surplus they receive. The model provides insights into how ownership of the different components of an inter-organizational system should be divided between the participants.
In another stream of research, the consequences of inter-organizational system adoption were investigated. Wang and Seidmann (1995) modeled Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) adoption among suppliers and showed that one supplier's adoption may cause negative externalities on other suppliers, leading to increased cost differentials in the supplier pool and increased concentration in the upstream market. This, in turn, may explain why some buyers use fewer suppliers in spite of the transaction cost reductions associated with EDI adoption. Seidmann and Sundararajan (1997) focused on the consequences of information sharing following the adoption of inter-organizational systems. They found that information sharing might change the relative bargaining power of the participants, thus rendering some participants worse off in spite of the collective increase in value to the participants as a group. In the context of procurement, the implementation of inter-organizational systems might result in the buyer appropriating rents from his suppliers due to increased competition among the suppliers.
Modeling EDI as a single technology with negative externalities among suppliers, Barua and Lee (1997) derived manufacturer penalty and subsidy policies aimed at providing efficient and effective incentives for suppliers to invest in EDI at a certain time. As technology converges toward a uniform standard (be it open or proprietary), the importance of investment incentives are reduced, as the investment can be used by the suppliers in multiple supply chain relationships. Thus, one may argue that as ITT continues to develop, and, potentially, the investment by suppliers in ITT increases, the relationship-specific part of the investment may actually be reduced.
Whereas the work in this paper is also studying buyer-supplier contracts, it differs from previous work in this area in that it does not consider contracting over investments in inter-organizational systems nor Banker, Kalvenes, and Patterson: Information Technology, Contract Completeness and Buyer-Supplier Relationships Information Systems Research 17(2), pp. 180-193, c 2006 INFORMS 5 the subsequent ex post bargaining over gains from these investments. Instead, the buyer-supplier contracts considered in this paper deal with the terms and conditions under which the suppliers provide the buyer with products. As such, it builds upon the principal-agent literature that deals with supplier monitoring cost.
In this context, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) point out that as the cost of monitoring suppliers decreases, the buyer will increase the weight of the performance-based part of the supplier compensation scheme. This paper expands upon these ideas by also considering which aspects of the suppliers' activities to include in a contract and, subsequently, which aspects to monitor.
Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an economic model of contract term and supplier selection when there are no relationship-specific costs. Section 3 provides analysis evaluating the impact of increased use of ITT on the optimal number of suppliers and level of contract completeness.
Section 4 extends the analysis in Section 3 by considering the effects of supplier investments in ITT on the buyer's optimal choices of the level of ITT, the number of suppliers to contract with, and the degree of contract completeness. Section 5 concludes the paper with a summary of our principal results and some suggestions for an empirical investigation that might confirm or contradict the model proposed in this paper.
Basic Model
Following the assumptions in Clemons et al. (1993) , consider a buyer that is using several suppliers to provide intermediate goods for his production activity. He can select from a large number of suppliers. The buyer can choose to include a number of factors in the contract with the suppliers. To be able to enforce a contract term, the buyer has to monitor the suppliers' compliance and such monitoring is costly. The cost of monitoring depends on the amount of ITT available to the buyer. Establishing a relationship with a supplier implies that a contract must be negotiated, blueprints must be exchanged, designs must be provided, and so on; all of which requires time. This time delay until an identified supplier can make delivery limits the reliance on spot markets for outsourcing intermediate goods. In other words, the scenario we model is one in which a buyer maintains a set of pre-qualified suppliers. Over the duration of a supplier contract, the buyer Information Systems Research 17(2), pp. 180-193, c 2006 INFORMS undertakes a multitude of projects, each of which requires goods and services from a number of suppliers.
Given the cost of ITT, the decision problem for the buyer involves the selection of the appropriate number of suppliers to pre-qualify as well as the number of performance dimensions to include in the supplier contract. The mathematical analysis of the buyer's problem optimizes the total benefit of contracting with the selected suppliers using the selected monitoring signals, net of the cost of monitoring those signals, the cost of coordinating the suppliers' activities, and the cost of the chosen level of ITT. In this model, we assume that there are no relationship-specific costs incurred by the supplier and, therefore, the buyer does not need to provide incentives to suppliers to participate. We assume that the buyer takes the cost of ITT as given. Finally, for analytical tractability, we assume that all functions are twice continuously differentiable with respect to all variables.
The value of the buyer's output, net of the cost of its production, depends on how many suppliers (n) the buyer is doing business with and on how many terms (x) are included in the supplier contracts. Thus, the buyer's net revenue (or benefit) function is
which is assumed to satisfy the conditions
where B i denotes the partial derivative ∂B/∂i of function B with respect to the variable i, i = n, x. Thus, the more suppliers the buyer is using and the more performance dimensions that are monitored, the higher is the buyer's net revenue. Increasing the number of suppliers increases the ability to find a supplier with good fit. Similarly, increasing the number of contract terms reduces the risk of variation in the suppliers' delivered product. Finding suppliers with a better fit implies positive first-order derivatives of the benefit function, B, with respect to x and n.
Selecting the number of terms (x) to include in the contract and, in particular, selecting the specific terms to include, may be a difficult problem in and of itself. Also, there is the risk of over-specifying a contract so 7 that a supplier is constrained to behave in a manner that is not efficient. For instance, if both on-time delivery performance and flexibility in product mix are part of the contract, enforcing both of these terms rigorously may result in the supplier increasing inventory levels, which in turn may lead to higher production costs over time. 1 We assume that the buyer is sufficiently rational to evaluate which contract terms will result in higher benefit to the buyer, and to evaluate the degree to which their inclusion will benefit the buyer.
Contract monitoring includes all activities that enforce the terms in the supplier contracts. The cost of monitoring the supplier contracts increases with the number of suppliers and the number of contract terms, and decreases with the available ITT (t) that facilitates the monitoring of supplier compliance. Therefore, the monitoring cost function is
We also assume that the marginal cost of monitoring (with respect to the number of suppliers and the number of contract terms, respectively) is decreasing with the level of ITT, i.e.,
With an increased use of B2B electronic commerce technology, communication of monitoring data can be standardized, which in turn will lead to a reduction in the marginal cost of monitoring with respect to the number of suppliers as well as the number of contract terms.
Consistent with Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1993b) , we use the term coordination cost so as to include all cost necessary to facilitate transactions between the buyer and the suppliers, including search cost. We assume that coordination cost increases with the number of suppliers and decreases with the level of ITT.
Hence, the coordination cost function is
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The marginal cost with respect to the number of suppliers decreases as the amount of ITT increases, i.e.,
The cost of monitoring and coordination depend on the available amount of ITT, t. The buyer decides how much ITT to deploy given the prevailing cost a of ITT. We assume that the technology cost function is increasing in both the amount of ITT acquired and the cost level a. Thus, the technology cost function is
The marginal cost is increasing both with respect to the amount of ITT and the cost of ITT, i.e.,
The assumption that K ta > 0 is consistent with any cost function of the form
is an increasing function of t. The assumption that K tt > 0 is consistent with a scenario in which there are diseconomies of scale when complementary ITT investments are taken into account. If the assumption about K tt is relaxed, it cannot be guaranteed that the technology cost function is convex.
Finally, we assume that the marginal cost of production and relationship-specific costs for both the buyer and the suppliers are zero, so that the total cost of the buyer's activities is captured by the contract monitoring, coordination, and technology costs.
The buyer's decision problem can then be formulated as
. For analytical tractability, we assume that the buyer's decision problem has an interior solution. 2 The first-order necessary conditions for a maximum are
and
The second-order sufficient conditions for a maximum are derived from the Hessian matrix
At a local optimum, the principal minor determinants of H U satisfy the conditions
det
Please note that, the conditions on the principal minor determinants also include U xx < 0 and U tt < 0, etc.
Analysis
An analysis of our model provides insights into the change in relationship between buyers and suppliers when the level of ITT changes as the cost of technology decreases. We begin by examining how the amount of technology employed by the buyer changes as the cost of ITT decreases. Once we have established that lower cost of ITT always leads to an increase in the level of ITT deployed by the buyer, we proceed to analyze how the use of ITT is re-allocated between the monitoring and coordination activities through changes in the number of suppliers and the degree of contract completeness chosen by the buyer as a result of changes in the level of ITT deployed.
PROPOSITION 1. The amount of ITT deployed by the buyer increases as the cost of ITT decreases.
PROOF. Applying the envelope theorem to the first-order conditions (13)-(15) for parameter a yields
We observe that U na = 0 and U xa = 0. Solving (20)- (21) for dn * /da and dx * /da yields
Substituting (24) into (23) yields
Substituting (25) into (24) yields
Substituting (25) and (26) into (22) and solving for dt * /da yields
Recognizing the denominator as det H U 3 and the second factor in the numerator as det H U 2 in (27), we can conclude that dt * /da < 0. That is, if the purchase price level a decreases, the optimal investment in technology, t * increases. £ Proposition 1 states that an exogenous decrease in a is equivalent to an exogenous increase in t * . This result is intuitively appealing. As the factor price of ITT goes down, the buyer will choose to deploy more of it.
The result is also consistent with the empirical observations in Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996) and Dewan and Min (1997) .
Given that a reduction in the cost of ITT will lead to increased use of this factor, we next analyze how a change in the level of ITT affects the number of suppliers selected by the buyer. In the discussion that follows, the sign of U nx = B nx − M nx will be of interest. The marginal net revenue of adding another supplier is smaller when contracts are more complete (x is large) than when contracts are less complete (x is small), since some of the expected benefit from finding a better fit by adding a supplier will be realized already by greater monitoring. Thus, B nx < 0, and in a sense, the number of suppliers used by a buyer and the level of contract completeness are (imperfect) substitutes for one another. Also, the marginal cost of monitoring an additional supplier is likely to be greater when there are more contract terms (x is large). 3 Thus, M nx is likely to be positive and the sign of U nx is likely to be negative.
PROPOSITION 2. The optimal number of suppliers decreases with the level of ITT if and only if
PROOF. By the chain rule,
dn * /da is given by equation (25) so that
By equation (18) 
That is, the ratio of the magnitude of change in the marginal value of adding a supplier to the magnitude of change in the marginal value of adding a contract term when there is an increase in the contract size is greater than the corresponding ratio of change in the marginal value of adding a supplier to the magnitude of adding a contract term when there is an increase in the level of ITT.
The change in the optimal number of suppliers when the amount of ITT increases can be explained intuitively in the following way. Consider the marginal net revenue and cost functions with respect to n in Figure 1 , where x * (n, t) is found by solving for x in the first-order necessary conditions (13) and (14) for a given t. In somewhat loose terms, if the optimal number of suppliers is to decrease with an increase in t, as suggested by Proposition 2, then the marginal cost M n (n, x * (n, t); t) + C n (n; t) must increase more than the increase in the marginal net revenue B n (n, x * (n, t)). That is,
Re-arranging the terms, this is equivalent to
Recall equation (20). By Proposition 1, dt * /da > 0, while U na = 0 by assumption. The equation can then be re-written as
Comparing this expression to equation (31) and recalling that U nn < 0 by the second-order conditions, this is equivalent to dn * /dt < 0. In Figure 1 , this is represented by the intersection of the curve M n (n, x * (n, t ′′ ), t ′′ ) + C n (n, t ′′ ) and the curve B n (n, x * (n, t ′ )). On the other hand, for the buyer to choose a larger number of suppliers as the amount of ITT increases, the marginal net revenue must increase more than the marginal Marginal Cost/Benefit ($)
B (n,x*(n,t)) B (n,x*(n,t'))
n'' Number of Suppliers n n n n n n n n n* n'
M (n,x*(n,t''),t'')+C (n,x*(n,t'')) M (n,x*(n,t),t)+C (n,x*(n,t)) M (n,x*(n,t'),t')+C (n,x*(n,t'))
cost. Please recall that we consider the marginal functions here with respect to the number of suppliers. In Figure 1 , this is represented by the intersection of the curves M n (n,
A necessary condition for dn * /dt < 0 is thus that
i.e., the increase in marginal cost due to an increase in the number of terms included in the contract is larger than the reduction in marginal cost due to ITT improvements. When dx * /dt > 0, this implies that M nx > 0 (i.e., economies of scale, if any, in the buyer's monitoring of its suppliers is dominated by an increase in supplier coordination costs). Figure 1 suggests that the increase in the number of contract terms must be quite large for the supplier pool to decrease as the level of ITT increases (the case represented by Proposition 2). In fact, the increase in contract size x must be so large that the total transaction cost per supplier increases even though both the coordination cost per supplier and the monitoring cost per contract term per supplier decrease. Thus, the change in the level of contract completeness will tend to moderate an increase in the supplier pool as the cost of monitoring and coordination decreases when more ITT is deployed, rather than to reduce the supplier pool size. A parametric example illustrating a supplier pool decrease as the cost of ITT goes down is provided in the Appendix.
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In practice, a reduction in the number of suppliers when the level of ITT increases is likely to be associated with the deployment of a radically new technology in the buyer-supplier relationship that enables the economical monitoring of a large number of new contract terms. This might be the case if the cost of process monitoring drops below a threshold level so that the buyer chooses to install a system for monitoring a vast array of supplier activities. As a consequence, the contract size increases dramatically, resulting in an increased cost per supplier used.
PROPOSITION 3. The optimal number of contract terms included in a contract decreases with the level of ITT if and only if
dx * /da is given by equation (26) This might happen if coordination cost is initially high so that the buyer chooses to use a relatively small number of suppliers with tightly specified contracts so as to make up for the otherwise poor expected fit resulting from the limited supplier pool. As the buyer increases the supplier pool as more ITT is deployed, the probability that the buyer can find a supplier with good fit increases even though the contract is less detailed.
Please note that, it is possible for U nx to take on a value so that the buyer would choose to add both suppliers and contract terms when the level of ITT increases. Intuitively, with enhanced ITT, the buyer is better off if he increases the number of suppliers (n) or the number of contract terms (x), or both. However, if U nx < 0 then increasing one of the two variables when the other is at a higher level yields less value to the buyer than when the other is at a lower level. In fact, if U nx is sufficiently negative, the buyer is worse off increasing both n and x, and his best option is either increasing n or increasing x. As the following corollary shows, it is never optimal for the buyer to reduce both the number of suppliers and the number of contract terms when the level of ITT increases. 
Substituting this relationship into equation (28) yields
Consequently,
violating the second-order condition in (18) for an interior optimum. £
The corollary is supported by the simple observation that if the buyer increase neither n nor x, then there is no reason to increase the amount of ITT deployed since ITT has no alternative use in our model.
A special case of the above analysis is of interest. If the degree of contract completeness cannot be changed, the buyer's decision problem is simplified to determine only the number of suppliers to do business with. Since C(n, t) and M (n, t) share the same characteristics with respect to n and t, these two functions can be represented by C(n, t) alone when x is treated as a constant. This results in the formulation max n,t
B(n) − C(n, t) − K(t; a). (42) For convenience, let V (n, t; a) = B(n) − C(n, t) − K(t; a).
The first-order necessary conditions for the maximum are
The second-order necessary and sufficient conditions are
COROLLARY 2. If the buyer takes the degree of contract completeness as given and the level of ITT increases, the buyer chooses to do business with a larger number of suppliers.
PROOF. Applying the envelope theorem and taking the total derivative of equation (43) with respect to a
Similarly, for equation (44),
Solving these two equations for dt * /da yields
Since V nn < 0, V ta < 0, and (48) and (49) for dx * /da yields
Consequently, as V nt > 0, dn * /da < 0 and dn * /dt > 0. £ This result is consistent with previous findings in Malone et al. (1987) and Bakos (1991) , who implicitly assume that the activities in a buyer-supplier relationship (such as which supplier activities are contracted and monitored) remain fixed while their cost goes down.
Supplier Investment in Technology
Suppose that the suppliers can choose their investment level in ITT. Further assume that the suppliers' investment in ITT has an impact on the buyer's cost and benefit functions. Similarly, the buyer's investment in ITT impacts the suppliers' cost of contracting and coordination. Let supplier i's benefit function be defined as D i (n, x), while the cost of monitoring and coordination is given by L i (s i ; x, t) and the cost of technology is given by P i (s i ; a). We assume that ∂L i /∂s i < 0, ∂L i /∂x > 0, ∂L i /∂t < 0, ∂P i /∂s i > 0, and 
where s i is supplier i's investment in ITT. For analytical tractability, we assume that all functions are twice continuously differentiable, problem (52) has an interior solution and the suppliers have identical, but stochastic cost functions so that their investments in technology are identical. We shall therefore suppress the subscript i in the suppliers' decision problem. The buyer will compensate the suppliers for their transaction and technology costs so that the buyer's decision problem is
We assume that the buyer decides on his technology investment, t, and that the suppliers takes this, as well as n and x as given when making their investment decisions, s. The buyer is a Stackelberg leader and the suppliers are followers. The buyer anticipates the suppliers' investment s when deciding n, x, and t. The suppliers' reaction function s * (n, x, t, a) can be found by solving the suppliers' decision problem (52) with respect to s. Consistent with the principal-agent literature, we assume that the buyer has perfect information about the suppliers' cost and benefit function, and the suppliers are compensated so that
The buyer can then solve the equivalent problem of maximizing social welfare (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991) 
where PROOF. The first-order conditions for the buyer's decision problem are
Applying the envelope theorem to Q n , Q x , Q t , and Q s , respectively, we get M (n, x, t, s) , so that a contraction in both n and x becomes attractive.
Conclusion
We expect the new millennium to bring with it a revolution in B2B electronic commerce, and companies will have to adjust the way in which they interact with each other when doing business. This research has addressed the specific question of how more efficient ITT will impact the relationship between buyers and their suppliers.
Contradicting predictions offered by transaction cost theory, previous empirical research observed that, as the use of ITT proliferates in buyer-supplier relationships, buyers in some industries choose to use a smaller number of suppliers. This paper developed a simple model in which contract monitoring cost in addition to search and coordination cost is introducted to capture the complexity in buyer-supplier relationships. If the marginal monitoring cost decreases as modern ITT is introduced, a buyer might choose to include more terms in his supplier contracts, thus making the contracts more complete. As a consequence of the additional contract terms to monitor, depending on the characteristics of the cost functions, the total cost of monitoring per supplier might increase, in spite of the lower per-term monitoring cost. The increase in monitoring cost per supplier may offset or even dominate the reduction in transaction cost brought about by the increased use of ITT, thus leading to a reduction in the optimal number of suppliers.
The paper provides some interesting avenues for empirical research. Our model shows that the number of suppliers might increase or decrease as modern ITT is introduced in buyer-supplier relationships, depending on the behavior of the different cost components that govern the relationships. These cost components might differ between industries, between firms within an industry, and might change over time with the development of new ITT. Also, we consider monitoring cost and relationship-specific cost as two alternative explanations for a possible reduction in the number of suppliers used by a buyer. It will be valuable to Information Systems Research 17(2), pp. 180-193, c 2006 INFORMS establish empirically which one has merit and, if both factors are relevant, which one is more important.
From an empirical point of view, the model developed in this paper presents some distinct challenges.
Most importantly, several of the model parameters are not observable. The amount of ITT deployed by a buyer for the purpose of contract monitoring or for the purpose of coordination of activities with suppliers is difficult to separate from ITT investments for other uses by the buyer. Similarly, it is not possible to obtain the cost per contract for monitoring. However, it is possible to observe both the number of suppliers used by a buyer and the size and complexity of the supplier contracts. Thus, an empirical investigation should focus on these two variables and how they relate to model predictions.
Our model takes as given the cost of ITT and predicts how the equilibrium in contract size, supplier pool, and level of deployed ITT changes as there are perturbations in the cost of ITT. ITT investments take time to implement. Therefore, it would be appropriate to study the change in equilibria over a time horizon of a few years.
Let ∆x/∆t be the change in contract completeness and let ∆n/∆t be the change in the number of suppliers as the amount of ITT changes. As argued previously, neither of these can be determined since t cannot be observed. However, the ratio of these two differentials, ∆x/∆t ∆n/∆t = ∆x ∆n can be observed. ∆x/∆n > 0 implies a positive correlation between the change in contract size and the change in number of suppliers. The existence of ∆x/∆n < 0 would provide support for the theory that increased contract monitoring cost might lead to a reduction in the number of suppliers.
Assuming that there are similarities in cost structure between companies within the same industry and that there are differences in cost structure between industries, the magnitude of the relationship between ∆x and ∆n can be studied for a number of industries. Differences between industries (such as positive or negative correlation between ∆x and ∆n) may be attributed to the cost structure in different industries.
As inter-organizational systems are standardized (for instance, through the transition from traditional EDI to web-based EDI), we expect that relationship-specific investments are reduced over time. A reduction in relationship-specific investments reduces the potential for ex post supplier renegotiaion of the contract. A longitudinal study of ∆x/∆n might reveal a reduction over time in the number of companies that reduce their supplier pools as more ITT is introduced. However, if reductions in the number of suppliers do not disappear, this would provide support for contract monitoring cost as an explanatory factor for supplier pool reduction over ex-post bargaining.
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Appendix. Parametric Example
In this appendix, we provide a parametric example to illustrate the effect of technology cost reductions on the number of suppliers and the number of contract terms. Define the following benefit and cost functions: Marginal Benefit/Cost ($)
Number of suppliers (n) B_n(n,x') M_n(n,x',t')+C_n(n,t') B_n(n,x'') M_n(n,x'',t'')+C_n(n,t'') ÙÖ ¾ Ò Ò Ø ÒÙÑ Ö Ó ×ÙÔÔÐ Ö× Ù ØÓ Ù× Ó ÑÓÖ ÁÌÌº A 1 = 1, 000, c 1 = 0.1, c 2 = 1.5, c 3 = 0.1, c 4 = 0.21, ρ = −10, A 2 = 0.5, α 2 = 1.1, β 2 = 2.5, γ 2 = 1.5, A 3 = 0.5, α 3 = 2, γ 3 = 0.5.
Suppose that a ′ = 300. The equilibrium choice of the number of suppliers, n ′ is 36, as indicated by the intersection of the functions B n (n, x ′ ) and M n (n, x ′ , t ′ ) + C n (n, t ′ ) in Figure 2 . As the cost of ITT decreases to a" = 263, the two functions shift up to B n (n, x") and M n (n, x", t") + C n (n, t"), respectively, with the intersection of the two curves defining the new equilibrium n" = 34. Table 1 summarizes the optimal choices of supplier size pool (n * ), contract size (x * ), and technology (t * ) for the parametric example. As the cost of technology (a) decreases, the amount of technology deployed increases. The availability of more technology changes the relative benefit of suppliers and contract terms so that the number of suppliers decreses while the number of contract terms increases. The reason for this shift is that as more contract terms are specified, the monitoring cost increases substantially so that the monitoring cost per supplier used increases although the monitoring cost per term has gone down. The increase in monitoring cost per supplier is larger than the reduction in coordination cost per supplier so that the net cost per supplier has increased (from 18.16 to 18.66).
Consistent with transaction cost economics, the buyer will choose to do business with fewer suppliers. 
